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The changing connections between business and political Islam under liberalisation can best 
be studied through an analysis of moral justifications, political connections in business and 
institutional modifications. Our evidence on energy utility privatisations through a 
comprehensive analysis of political connections with firm and industry specific data 
demonstrates that Turkey’s Justice and Development Party reshaped industry structures to 
nurture a new breed of politically linked businesses. In order to build a patronage regime in 
energy markets, the party manipulated regulatory institutions, suppressed the media and 
advocacy groups, and immobilised the judicial process in response to allegations of 
misconduct. The highly personalised and opaque allocation of assets increased the power of 
business groups that enjoyed close ties with the Prime Minister and key party officials. 
Leading politically connected firms emerged as not only the major beneficiaries but also key 
supporters of authoritarian politics. Our findings have important implications for the analysis 
of political Islam, regulatory institutions, and the vulnerabilities of energy privatisations in 
emerging economies.  
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ENERGY PRIVATISATIONS, BUSINESS-POLITICS CONNECTIONS AND 




The Washington Consensus has been a powerful transformational policy tool for the 
economic liberalisation trajectory of emerging economies. However, the “consensus” 
template was selectively adopted and “morphed” according to the objectives and interests 
of policy elites (Peck, 2010) 1 . The neo-liberal economic perspective provided the 
underlying rationale for market liberalisation in a variety of forms. The critical 
consequence is that the outcome of the past two decades of policy experimentation has 
neither been a decisive departure from neo-liberalism nor a new model of post-liberal 
transformation (Öniş, 2006; Ban and Blyth, 2013; Groves et al, 2013). These important 
findings call into question the economic resilience and global influence of the leading 
emerging economies. The persistent implications of neo-liberal policies for the allocation 
of assets and opportunities, industry structures and political institutions deserve further 
investigation.  
Our paper extends this approach and analyses energy privatisations in Turkey. Neo-
liberalism can be described as an ideological stance, a political discourse and at the same 
time a policy tool for market liberalisation policies. In this paper we mainly refer to it as a 
policy tool and market governance approach2. What makes Turkey interesting, and unique 
among Muslim nations, is that its market liberalisation had first been opposed and later 
adopted by an Islamic political movement that rose to prominence in the 1990s and 
consolidated its democratic gains in the 2000s with a parliamentary majority of the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP).  With the support of the rapid growth of Islamic charities 
and fraternity organisations, the AKP challenged the secular status quo and achieved three 
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consecutive electoral victories in national polls since 2002. However, its broader appeal for 
the masses rested on steady economic growth, a centre-right liberal outlook (Tepe, 2005; 
Bacik, 2008), and systematic purges the party undertook against its critics and opponents 
(Polat, 2013). Discussions of the so-called “Turkish Model” and Weberian “Islamic 
Calvinists”, through which political Islam authenticated its form of market capitalism, have 
been widespread in European policy and academic circles for a decade (ESI, 2005; Tuğal, 
2012). The economic and political trajectory of the country is closely watched by other 
Muslim states, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. Therefore, Turkey’s 
developmental trajectory carries emblematic significance for Islam’s relationship with 
democracy and capitalism. 
Our analytical framework shows that neo-liberal policy customisations take place 
through moral justifications, political connections in business and institutional 
modifications. The evidence presented in this paper suggests less of a success story, and 
shows the growing political and economic uncertainties. The outcome of energy utility 
privatisations illustrates how the AKP adapted the Washington Consensus principles to 
reshape industry structures and nurture a new breed of politically connected businesses in 
gas and electricity distribution networks between 2003 and 2013. In order to build a 
patronage regime in energy markets, the AKP government manipulated regulatory 
institutions, suppressed the media and advocacy groups, and immobilised the judicial 
process in response to allegations of misconduct. At the same time the party facilitated new 
partnership structures among its affiliated business groups and small regional players in 
order to overcome their financial and managerial constraints. Highly personalised and 
opaque allocations of assets have essentially increased the power of business groups that 
enjoyed close ties with then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (here after, PM 
Erdoğan)3 and leading party members.  
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The paper makes contributions in the following areas. First, we demonstrate the 
importance of interchange between moral ideologies and neo-liberalism, supporting views 
on the adaptability of the Washington Consensus (Peck, 2010; Babb, 2013). We also show 
how religious justifications have been employed for the economic empowerment of new 
interest groups. This finding indicates a profound rupture in the character of political elites 
and market rules (Rudnyckyj, 2009; Tuğal, 2009; Atia, 2012; Polat, 2013). Second, the 
empirical evidence illustrates how re-allocation regimes of energy utility privatisations 
generated a new breed of politically connected firms through regulatory and judicial 
interventions. This finding supports studies that have shown the influence of political 
control over privatisations and deep ties between ex-politicians and privatised firms in 
cross-country analyses (Ramamurti, 2002; Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar, 2008; Barlotti and 
Faccio, 2009). However, we illustrate how a single political party in power can create a 
comprehensive system of politically connected firms. Finally, the impact of deepening ties 
between the government and businesses requires further analysis. Our evidence on the 
customisation of privatisations contributes to the debate on the value and costs of political 
connections (Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak and Mitton, 2010), implications for 
political institutions and the regulatory environment (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Choi 
and Thum, 2009; Hefetz et al., 2012), the contested legitimacy of business fortunes, and 
economic development prospects (Authors, Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2008). 
The article proceeds with an analysis of three propositions on moral ideologies, 
political connections, and biased institutional modifications of business-politics ties. This 
is followed by a background analysis of the rise of political Islam and its incorporation of 
neo-liberalism. Our evaluation of electricity and gas privatisations in the fourth section 
presents the stages and the scope of de-regulation across regions. The fifth section provides 
a comprehensive analysis of political connections with firm and industry specific data. The 
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conclusion reviews the theoretical and empirical contributions of the paper.  
 
2. Analytical Framework 
We analyse the changing connections between business and politics under political Islam 
through an examination of moral philosophies, the nature of ties, and institutional 
workings.  The following propositions frame our perspective:  
Proposition 1: Moral customisations of the neo-liberal economic rationale provide 
means for significant political transformations. In his book, Morals by Agreement, 
Gauthier (1986) suggested that a perfectly competitive market is a morally free zone, an 
arena of social life in which moral evaluation has no role to play. Hausman (1989) 
provided a critique of the notions of a morally free market. What underlines this 
understanding of markets, Hausman (1989) points out, is “a hypothetical history in which 
individuals convert Hobbes’ brutish state of nature into Locke’s docile one by not 
benefiting themselves at the expense of others” (p. 330). Markets promoted freedom in two 
ways according to Milton Freedman: i) participation in economic action is itself an 
exercise of freedom; ii) markets guarantee a separation of powers that is necessary for 
political freedom. Proponents of neo-liberalism have long assumed that since markets 
accomplish the economic tasks of allocation and distribution without relying on a 
centralised bureaucracy they prevent such monopoly (McMohan, 1981: 273).  
On the contrary, applications of neo-liberal economics did not lead to the envisaged 
freedom and separation of powers but rather mutated in opposite directions. Any synthesis 
between moral philosophies and neo-liberalism simultaneously reconfigures the role of the 
state and political institutions as a counter trend to secularisation. In Russia, the increasing 
power of the Orthodox Church goes hand in hand with oligarchic market control and the 
legitimisation of President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule (Payne, 2010). In Mexico, 
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the promotion of popular capitalism and free enterprise widened the opportunities for 
entrepreneurs in the economy, politics and the government with increasing international 
ties. However, the rise of the new right and social Christian values clashed with libertarian 
groups in this process (Salas-Porras, 2005). In the USA, Christianity has been a force to 
promote religiously motivated morality over markets. Much of neo-conservative politics, 
and especially the Tea Party movement, support economic liberalism with fundamentalist 
religious values along with intolerance to liberties4. 
One of the most interesting examples of moral adaptations is the incorporation of 
Islamic beliefs and norms into neo-liberal policy frameworks in countries such as 
Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey. The rise of Islamism across a number of developing 
countries has been both a response to the crisis in secular nationalist development projects 
as well as an outcome of a societal search for an alternative authentic moral direction for 
economic development, empowerment, and justice (Gülalp, 1999; Authors; Atai, 2012). A 
number of scholars argued that neo-liberalism transformed political Islam and facilitated 
its shift from economic exclusion and political marginalisation to a move towards power 
domination. Paradoxically, this conversion happened through a discourse of authentication 
and condemnation of western capitalism (Authors; Yavuz, 2004; Tuğal 2009). The process 
of change showed not only the adaptability of neo-liberalism but also of Islam on an 
individual level and Islamism on the political stage (Atia, 2012).  The rejuvenation of 
political Islam involved the spread of religious values for an individual’s transformation, 
for a new self-interested and disciplined workforce, and for an authentic national economic 
revival (Rudnyckyj, 2009). Islam as a belief system is not centralized and hierarchical. 
While there are no structures of authority to integrate communities and marginalize 
extremists, there is also no “monolithic” religious organisation (McGraw, 2010). 
Consequently, there emerged a fertile ground for market applications and moral 
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justifications in the absence of ecclesiastical directives. Rudnyckyj’s (2009: 131) 
description of an emerging spiritual economy in the most populous Muslim country, 
Indonesia, illustrates reflexive transformation: 
“The creation of a spiritual economy in Indonesia is neither a wholesale translation 
of Weber’s spirit of capitalism, nor is it a strict interpretation of Islamic texts and practices. 
It is an unprecedented assemblage that is as much the Islamisation of neo-liberalism as it is 
the neo-liberalisation of Islam.”  
Other scholars also support this observation.  In Egypt there has been a similar 
spiritual revival as a form of pious neo-liberalism. This moral call empowered Islamist 
movements and opened new channels in domestic politics (Atia, 2012; Ismail 2012; 2013).  
Proposition 2: Privatisations offer opportunities for new allocation mechanisms in 
favour of politically connected firms. The spread and effects of political connections in 
businesses are widely acknowledged but mostly understudied within the context of neo-
liberal transformations. Studies on politically connected firms (here after PCF) offer a 
useful avenue to explore the nature of politics-business relations with a prospect of better 
understanding of the changes taking place at firm and industry levels under privatisations. 
Business-politics connections are described in a number of studies as direct and indirect 
involvement of politicians and their close associates in firm ownership and management 
(Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and Mcconnell, 2006).  Firm based studies show that 
businesses get preferential access to a number of value enhancing resources and 
opportunities through political favouritism.  Politicians, however, collect rents and/or 
electoral support in return. 
Faccio (2006) found corporate political connections to be relatively widespread 
(they exist in 35 of the 47 countries that she sampled). But they appear to be less common 
in countries with more stringent regulation of political conflicts of interest and more 
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widespread in countries that are perceived as being highly corrupt. Connections are also 
more widespread among larger firms. However, the study detected a rather small and 
sporadic number of PCF in some countries where PCF were expected to be widespread. 
For example, it identified only one company connected with a minister or MP in Turkey 
and the Philippines, and none in South Africa and Brazil.  
Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 firms in Pakistan between 1996 and 
2002, Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that PCF borrow 45 per cent more and have 50 per 
cent higher default rates than others. They conclude that such preferential treatment occurs 
exclusively in government banks and has an economic cost as it often goes to poorly 
performing firms. Similarly, in her study on Italy, Sapienza (2004) shows that state-owned 
banks serve as a mechanism to supply political patronage. In a cross-country examination, 
Faccio, Masulis and Mcconnell (2006) illustrate that PCFs are more likely to be bailed out 
than are their non-connected peers and they exhibit poorer operating performance than 
others at the time of the bailout and over the following two years. Johnson and Mitton 
(2003) pointed out that PCF benefited from the capital controls imposed in Malaysia 
during the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and those associated with Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad had significantly higher stock returns. By using political campaign 
contribution data, Claessens, Feijen and Laeven (2008) similarly show that Brazilian firms 
that provided contributions to elected federal deputies experienced higher stock returns 
than firms that did not.  
While clearly privatisations offer opportunities for new allocation mechanisms in 
favour of politically connected firms, studies mostly focus on post-privatisation. Boubakri, 
Cosset and Saffar (2008) investigated the extent of political connections in newly 
privatized firms around the world. Using a sample of 245 privatized firms headquartered in 
27 developing countries and 14 industrialised countries over the period 1980 to 2002, the 
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authors find that 87 firms have a politician or an ex-politician on their board of directors or 
supervisory board. They also show that political connections of newly privatised firms are 
a worldwide phenomenon. They illustrate that the ideology of the executive appeared to be 
insignificant, a result that contrasts with theoretical arguments in Biais and Perotti (2002) 
and empirical evidence based on OECD countries in Bortolotti and Faccio (2009). A 
centralised system of political authority, Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) show, increases 
government control over privatised firms. However, none of these analyses explain how 
political parties promote connections and use privatisations as means of building power in 
markets. 
Proposition 3:  Deepening business-politics ties alters industry structures, political 
institutions and development prospects. Political interference in privatised firms brings 
about the question of the benefits and impairments of political connections on industry 
structures, political institutions and development models. Political economy approaches 
look at the issue through economic justice, regime type and allocative efficiency points of 
view. Such studies tend to link political interference to business or businessmen’s careers 
in politics in relation to corruption and clientelist ties. They examine how relations 
between dominant business groups and the state shape the political regime type and 
institutional trajectories (Nam 1995; Guriev and Rachinsky 2005; Choi and Thum 2009). 
They also address the way in which client business networks and lobby groups benefit 
from selective and pro-business programmes and in turn shape the policy agenda (Salas-
Porras 2005; Thomas et al. 2009).  
Robinson and Verdier (2003) argue that clientelism emerges in countries where 
productivity is low. However, it is prematurely assumed that modernisation and 
development eliminates clientelism. The first necessary condition is that the relation must 
be beneficial for both parties and there is a scale problem5. A well-known example of 
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clientelism is the relationship between large companies and the state in the era of Park 
Chung-hee’s military regime between 1963 and 1979 in South Korea. Nam (1995) shows 
how most of the financial incentives were given to the largest companies in return for their 
support of the military regime. The government controlled the allocation of credit and 
foreign currency, and the chaebol enjoyed preferential access to these and other resources. 
Thus, not only the connections but also the character of the connectedness have 
important implications for political institutions. In many late industrialising economies, 
governments historically developed clientelist ties with industrialists and supported the 
formation of business groups by protecting them through tariffs and trade restrictions. 
They also granted discretionary concessions (for example, in media, mining, and other 
licensed and regulated sectors), direct and indirect subsidies to certain favoured industries 
(Buğra 1995; Khanna, and Palepu, 1999). However, privatisation changes the relationship 
between politicians and businesses. 
Studies on post-Soviet economies showed that state insiders, as managers of 
economic units and civil servants, diffused into the ownership structures of key industries 
through de-regulation and privatisation. While inter-elite conflicts have led to opaque 
allocation mechanisms, authoritarian political regimes are progressively entrenched 
whereby ruling elites increased their ownership and/or political control of the key 
industrial assets (Authors; Junisbai 2012). In a study of Russia’s largest oligarchs, Guriev 
and Rachinsky (2005) illustrate how the concentration of ownership of large industrial 
establishments served the highly corrupt political regime in which neither oligarchs nor the 
bureaucracy are interested in implementing policies that will open the economy to broader 
participation, fair allocation and competition. In China, Wank (2002) argues that clientelist 
networks evolved in line with market opening as the business fortunes of those connected 
to the Communist Party increased. Local officials implemented the economic reform 
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policies first and foremost as a way to ensure their self-interest and provide further benefits 
to the political elite. 
Political actors around the world have distributed a large number of state assets 
according to their customisation of neo-liberal policies. Party ideologies and leadership 
styles become important in determining institutional workings and the direction of change. 
Thus, choices made by political elites in the allocation of assets have long-term 
implications for governance and markets (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). 
 
3. The Political Economy of Neo-Islamic Liberalisation  
The September 1980 military coup created initial conditions for market de-regulation and 
subsequent suppression of opposition interests and left wing politics. Tied to an economic 
reform agenda, Turkey had three disbursements with IMF stand-by agreements between 
1980 and 1984.  The largest amount, 1.250 billion USD, was received in 1980 (Arpac and 
Bird, 2009). Throughout the 1990s, liberalisation policies focused primarily on financial 
deregulation to address endemic crises in public finances and budget deficit problems. 
Notwithstanding its undemocratic origins, however, Turkey’s market liberalisation lacked 
focus and was riddled with boom and bust cycles.  The government followed a hot money 
policy of high interest rates for treasury bills and domestic currency appreciation to attract 
short-term speculative financial capital to compensate for the increasing growth in 
government expenditures. While the government was the major borrower, foreign and 
domestic banks, as the major lenders, had the financial incentives to main this high interest 
margin (Bakır, 2009; 580-81). The privatisation model, which was carried out through 
cabinet decrees and strong executive authority, met political and judicial opposition. The 
Constitutional Court overruled the privatisation initiatives of key strategic industries on 
several occasions (Çetin and Oğuz, 2007). The 1990s were years of asymmetric but 
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widespread financial crises in Argentina, Mexico, Russia and East Asia where Washington 
Consensus applications brought about dismal growth prospects (Macleod, 2004; Babb, 
2013). Turkey had weak coalition governments and no visible leadership in the economy. 
The first major challenge to neo-liberal policies was a fiscal and balance of payment crisis 
followed by an IMF stabilisation program in 1994 and another in 1999 (Öniş, 2011; Bakır 
and  Öniş  2010).   
Triggered initially by a political dispute, a more severe financial crisis came with 
the stock market crash of 2001. In response to rapid deterioration in economic outlook, a 
range of banking reforms and institutional arrangements put in place by the coalition 
government brought about significant regulatory improvements and institutional stability. 
A former World Bank technocrat, Kemal Dervis, designed the key reform policies of the 
IMF stabilisation package as Turkey’s economy minister, which significantly improved the 
economic outlook (Arpac and Bird, 2009)6.  These were accompanied by a major wave of 
democratisation as part of the EU accession process. 
The rise of Islamic politics to centre stage has been closely linked to widespread 
discontent with market liberalisation, which was associated with reckless western 
capitalism, societal inequalities, and financial failures7.  Erdoğan’s election as the mayor of 
Istanbul in 1994 powered the rise of the Islamic political movement, which subsequently 
led to the formation of AKP in 2001. The party cadres came from right wing religious 
formations 8 . Benefitting from its predecessor’s reforms that established the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Authority, AKP broadly followed the Consensus principals. 
The FDI law in 2004 removed remaining bureaucratic obstacles. FDI peaked in 2007 and 
2011, two AKP general election victory years (see Figure 1). After the last conditional 
IMF loan in 2006, a more confident AKP began to follow disjointed economic policies. 
Turkey accumulated large currency reserves, its economic growth looked less affected by 
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the 2008 financial crisis, and the country grew less dependent on IMF loans as it could 
borrow from international markets9. However, Turkey has also become one of the most 
leveraged economies with a net external debt of 413 billion USD, about 51 per cent of 
GDP (Harvey and Bilgic, 2013). With slow economic growth, increasing inflation, and the 
highest trade deficit in history (79.8 billion USD), the economic outlook looks rather 
shaky.  
Neo-liberalism and democratisation offered two critical tools for AKP in its 
aspiration towards hegemonic regime change (Polat, 2013). The party re-configured the 
institutions of the secular state establishment. In the markets, it strengthened its control 
over privatisations, urban development projects and capital flows. The social welfare 
reforms in public health, mass housing provisions and education received popular support 
(Bartu and Kolluoglu 2008; Tekeli and Kaplan, 2008; Karaman, 2013). Increasingly 
authoritarian, PM Erdoğan consolidated his power over the media (Kuban and Sozeri, 
2012).  In response to the wave of protests in the summer and autumn of 2013 and several 
high profile corruption scandals in December 2013, the AKP introduced extensive purges 
in the judiciary, the police and civil service.10   
AKP’s neo-liberal economic policies have been popularly promoted through a 
veneer of Islamic ethics and symbols, which also endorsed intolerance and conservative 
beliefs in society.   
i) Moral markets: Promoting the idea of an authenticated capitalism resting on morally 
superior Islamic principals has been one of the key pillars. This crystallised in the 
promotion of openly religious entrepreneurs who supported Islamic politics and frequently 
demonstrated their piety through public acts of charity and rituals (Atasoy, 2009; Hoşgör, 
2011).  The establishment of MÜSİAD, in 1990 was the first step in the growth of 
formalised pro-Islamic business solidarity (Çokgezen, 2000). Intra-business struggles led 
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to organisational splits between pro-AKP associations and their rivals (Authors; Bayırbağ, 
2011)11. MÜSİAD and later TUSKON (established in 2005) enjoyed extensive political 
and business ties with the AKP government.12  Without resting on a well-defined Islamic 
economics or code of practices (Kuran, 1997) 13, religious references, donations and 
charity activities were frequently used as acts of Islam’s ethics in economic behaviour. 
Paradoxically, the usury banned by Islam has been widely used among conservative 
businessmen14.  
ii) Virtuous individual:  The belief that good Muslims do not cheat, they care about the 
poor and fellow Muslims, and do not touch illicit and forbidden gains have been widely 
promoted. Despite opposite examples, such as fraudulent financial partnership initiatives 
(Authors), this created an effective discourse on the virtues of Islamic business ethics as 
opposed to secular ones with dubious morals.  AKP in power promoted religious education 
by changing the national curriculum and increasing the number of priesthood’ schools, 
with a total disregard to the sizeable non-Sunni population15.  Islamic women with 
headscarves became an important symbol of virtue. AKP’s leading politicians’ wives 
routinely emerged in public with long dresses and stylised headscarves.  While being 
highly effective supporters of the party, these women rarely emerged out of the control of 
men. Obedient, docile and religious women have been showcased as models of the new 
society. In many occasions, male AKP MPs have expressed their illiberal views on 
abortion, dress style, and the behaviour of women16. 
iii) Networked Islamic community: Liberalisation helped the growth of a popular version 
of Islam under the control of Islamic brotherhood networks beyond and within the state. 
Islamist politicians have long been active in informal networks of various fraternity 
groups. These developed alternative markets, a parallel societal force, and a geographically 
diffused system of charity, education and welfare organisations. Thanks to the modern 
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advanced economy that AKP inherited, its economic advances has been more successful 
than other Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Tuğal, 2012; 
Gumuscu, 2010). Tuğal (2009) referred to this transformation as the de-radicalisation of 





4. Gas and Electricity Utility Privatisations 
Over the past decade three consecutive AKP governments presided over the most 
extensive privatisation programme in the energy utility sector. The political significance of 
this sector rests in its strategic position in a growing domestic market and the dependency 
on foreign energy sources. There are three important structural outcomes of AKP’s 
privatisation programmes. The first is the changing industry structure brought about by a 
new configuration of state control and growing private sector ownership. The second are 
governance changes that affected the institutions of regulation.  Political interference by 
leading party individuals and their relatives paralysed regulators. Thirdly, new allocation 
mechanisms spread assets to new national champions and local SMEs. These happened 
frequently through block sales rather than utilising capital markets. 
The privatisations of energy utilities have been pursued under broadly similar 
liberalisation templates since the 1990s following IMF and World Bank guidelines (see 
Andres, Foster, and Guasch, 2006 for Latin America; Sirasoontorn and Quiggin, 2007 on 
Thailand, and Tankha, 2009 for Brazil). Private finance began investing in the entire 
energy sector and new hydroelectric power plants and two nuclear power stations were 
planned from the late 2000s. However, some of the fundamentals of Turkish energy 
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markets remain fixed. The country relies heavily on imported gas and oil whilst it also 
aspires to be a regional market and a transit hub between Europe and Asia. It promotes 
new energy routes to complement the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In 2012 domestic gas 
production (632 million standard cubic meter-Sm3) was dwarfed by imports (45,922 
million Sm3). Russia was the major supplier (58%) followed by Iran (18%), and Algeria 
(9%). The state owned gas supplier, BOTAS, almost had monopoly status in imports (92.2 
per cent). Nearly half of the imported gas is used in electricity production (48 per cent) 
(EPDK, 2013).  
A governance template, with largely independent regulatory institutions, was in 
place when AKP came to power. The formation of the Energy Market Regulatory Agency 
(EPDK), the Turkish Electricity Market Law and the Natural Gas Market Law were 
enacted in 2001 (see Atiyas and Dutz, 2004; Özkıvrak, 2004; Ulusoy and Oğuz, 2007). As 
a semi-independent governmental body supervised by the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources, EPDK’s board is independent over licensing and other market related activities. 
There is no parliamentary committee to oversee its activities. Thus, compared with the pre-
2001 era, the post-2001 governance regime permitted executive control to shape new 
market structures. This expedited the de-regulation of the sector that had begun with the 
first privatisation law for the electricity sector in 1984 and the split of the Turkish 
Electricity Authority (TEK) into two companies in 1993, one for generation and 
transmission (TEAŞ) and another for distribution and retailing (TEDAŞ). Generation and 
transmission was unbundled into three state owned enterprises: a production, a 
transmission and a wholesale company. However, full privatisation was not possible until 
the 2000s due to financial constraints and strong bureaucratic opposition. As a response, 
ad-hoc strategies were used to permit business groups to enter the sector with Treasury 
guarantees during the AKP governments (see Çetin and Oğuz, 2007). 
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New allocation mechanisms for state assets have been mostly through block sales 
(see Figure 2). Privatisation through capital markets was rarely used. By opting for the 
block sale method, AKP governments showed their preference for revenue maximisation 
and rapid results as opposed to prioritising the inclusion of broader segments of the 
population (Öniş, 2011). While capital markets are newly developing, block sale also 
offers wider possibilities to build political control over the process. A number of major 
privatisation cases included foreign and domestic consortia as well as major Turkish banks 
and old business groups.  For example Türk Telekom A.Ş. was purchased by OGER 
Telecom (a Saudi-led consortium); the state refinery, TÜPRAŞ, was acquired by the Koç 
Holding and Shell, while TEKEL, the state alcohol and tobacco monopoly, was privatised 
through the asset sale method and was first purchased by British American Tobacco and 
local firms. The privatisation of a 25 per cent share of Halk Bank was done through a 
public offering. Apart from these high profile sales, major market transformations in the 
energy sector took place through the piecemeal sale of assets (see Atiyas and Dutz, 2004). 
Privatisation has generated a total of 53.54 billion USD in revenues over the period 1986–
2013 (see Figure 1). The revenues collected in the pre-2001 period represented only a 
small fraction of this amount, 8.4 billion USD between 1985 and 2000 (of which 2.7 
billion USD was generated in a single year, 2000). Large-scale privatisations brought 
significant implications for public revenues. Electricity privatisations were most extensive; 
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The transfer of operating rights through share sales has been the most common 
model of privatisation of the electricity distribution network. In this model, winning firms 
have the right to hold a unique distribution license for specific regions but ownership of 
capital assets remains with the state. The winner becomes a regional monopoly, and 
households have no choice to buy electricity from other firms. Hence, there is no 
mechanism to create competition and consumer surplus. In addition, the government 
guarantees an income floor through retail price control overseen by the EPDK. 
Bagdadioglu, Basaran and Price (2007) question if indeed a cost reflective tariff has been 
an essential component of Turkish electricity reform. They show that the tariffs create real 
hardship for some households, which might not be compensated through the rather 
underdeveloped Turkish social security system. To avoid the possible political costs of this 
situation before the general election of November 2007, the government disregarded 
EPDK’s advice and postponed pursuing such tariffs for at least five years.  
 
Political connections in privatisations 
In our empirical analysis we studied all electricity and gas privatisation bids and 
their winning firms, then scrutinised the existence of political ties between the firms and the 
AKP. First, we categorised political connections and then filtered and sieved media and 
internet sources to identify the type of connections for each firm. The formal procedures of 
building connections have been opaque, leading to questions about the status of regulatory 
boards in safeguarding their independence (Sönmez, 2011). AKP frequently interfered in 
the process (Çetin and Oğuz, 2007; Öniş, 2011). However, there has been no 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the degree of political control over market de-
regulation. Thus, our study provides an original analysis that also complements our recent 
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paper on business performance and political connectedness in Turkish industry rankings 
(Authors). 
Benefitting from Faccio’s (2006) analysis we distinguish two types of political 
connectedness: direct personal ties (PCF-1) and networked access to politicians (PCF-2). 
The first group enjoys direct channels of informal and personal access to the Prime 
Minister, Cabinet Ministers and leading AKP members of parliament and/or may have 
them as owners and managers. Some PCF-1 are well-known such as the rapidly growing 
Çalık Holding whose CEO is the son-in-law of PM Erdoğan (Tunç, 2010). The board 
chairman of Kiler Holding is the brother of a leading AKP member of parliament (Harvey 
and Bentley, 2010); and the chairman of the board of Cengiz Holding is a close associate 
of PM Erdoğan.  The second group of ties (PCF-2) involve indirect access through 
institutional networks of the pro-AKP business lobbies, MÜSİAD and TUSKON.  We 
identified these firms through “Tuskontrade” and “e-MÜSİAD” web engines. We checked 
the accuracy of information through other web sources, company information sites, as well 
as the trade press17.  
We studied different stages of privatisation bids through archival data of several 
state agencies since there is no single body of information. As gas and electricity utility 
privatisations have been completed recently, the data we compiled here shows an original 
analysis of the spread of assets among firms. The official privatisation data is available 
through the records of the Privatisation Agency (Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı). In 
addition, we reviewed the publications of the EPDK and the Official Journal of the Turkish 
State (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmi Gazetesi) to identify the winning firms (in electricity 
between 2008-2013 and in gas distribution between 2003-2013). Additional sources, such 
as the reports of professional bodies, advocacy groups and interviews with industry experts 
at the international energy conference in 2012 provided further depth to our analysis18. 
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5. Findings  
A distinct feature of utility privatisations is the extended length of stages. The bidding 
process experienced long delays due to bureaucratic interventions, bilateral negotiations 
and monetary constraints of firms in debt financing. Although a closed-envelope method is 
utilised for collecting offers, the allocation decision process continues with bilateral 
negotiations. If necessary, the Auction Commission can contact the firms that are in the 
process of negotiation with EPDK for public auction (Privatisation Agency, 2009 and 
2010). The evidence shows that an SME-based privatisation with no significant FDI flow 
encountered frequent liquidity problems. Bidders’ inability to follow through on their 
commitments led to alternative arrangements of financial pooling. The strategic 
preferences of bidders led them to switch among different bids in order to maintain their 
liquidity 19 . SMEs formed consortia to increase their financial and business power, 
especially in electricity bids20. The beneficiary firms as listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are 
mostly new to the energy sector. As newly diversifying business groups they have stakes in 
construction, trade and services, but often with no or a small industrial base. Some of them 
such as Kiler, Yıldızlar SSS, Limak and Arsan-İşkur-Kipaş entered the electricity sector 
after 2002. A closer examination of other consortia also shows that firms in media, 
education and services formed alliances to benefit from privatisations.  
The bargaining nature of the process created a vulnerable structure amenable to 
political interventions and informal transactions. There are allegations of insider dealings 
by the bidder firms21; poor bureaucratic oversight, and corruption in assessment of bids 
and offer decisions22. However, these claims have not been fully investigated since TEAŞ 
have carried out privatisation agreements with confidentiality clauses. These clauses 
blocked the possibility of open scrutiny and information over the privatisation of public 
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assets23. The appointment of family members and relatives of AKP ministers and MPs to 
key government positions, including to those regulatory institutions further hindered the 
transparency and damaged the credibility of the selection process. A case in point is the 
appointment of the AKP minister and the then Speaker of the Parliament Cemil Çiçek’s 
son to the board of EPDK24. Energy experts we interviewed pointed out that the AKP 
focused on a re-allocation struggle to favour a clientelistic regime instead of developing a 
long-term energy strategy25. PM Erdoğan’s son was alleged to have benefitted as a 






The vast majority of bids (16 of 20) was won by AKP connected firms (see Table 
1)27.  There is a clear bias towards firms that enjoy direct personal ties to leading AKP 
members (PCF-1). Kolin and Limak have individually and collectively won the most bids 
along with Cengiz Holding, all closely associated with PM Erdoğan. Another PCF-1 
consortium, Elsan-Tümaş-Karaçay, secured one of the largest markets, the Gediz region.  
Advocacy groups and professional associations have been campaigning for a more 
transparent system of transfer. However, their opinions were sidelined by the government 
and were rarely reported in the mainstream media. A special report by the Chamber of 
Electrical Engineers [CEE] (EMO, 2009) provides a detailed study of the irregularities in 
electricity privatisation bids in three regions. The analysis traces the partnership structures 
and sheds light on network relations among individuals linked to the governing party, the 
Prime Minister and Istanbul Municipality. The region of Göksu28 (see Table 1) was won by 
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AKEDAŞ in 1996 under the predecessor of AKP, the Refah Party coalition government, 
but the transfer did not take place due to legal challenges. The CEE study found that the 
company ownership structure changed to include partners linked to the government at the 
transfer stage. This firm remained on paper for 13 years and was re-granted the bid in 2008 
under a new structure as a partnership of Arsan-İşkur-Kipaş. In one report the major 
owners were said to come from the textile industry, one being Kipaş textile (with 27.5% 
share) 29. AKEDAŞ is now listed as a subsidiary of Kipaş Holding30. In the region of 
Menderes (see Table 1) the winning bid changed its partnership structure without EPDK 
having performed due diligence. The new partners were reportedly affiliated with a 
business group that owns a pro-government TV channel and was linked to a charity fraud 
case shelved by the government31.  
In the third region, Meram32, the winning bidder, Alarko, went into partnership 
with the third bidder, Cengiz Holding, after it won the tender alone. This partnership is 
purported to be linked to the influence of the AKP ties of Cengiz Holding.  The company 
had already won other large public tenders such as Eti Aluminium (see Table 3)33. 
Controversy over Eti Aluminium’s privatisation in 2005 points out corrupt deals between 
the firm and the leading AKP ministers and the Prime Minister34. Another professional 
organisation, the Chamber of Metallurgical Engineers [CME], challenged the privatisation 
decision of Eti Aluminium with the claim that the process was unconstitutional and 
included irregularities. Although the chamber won the case, the AKP government did not 
enforce the court decision and the handover of Eti Aluminium to Cengiz Holding went 
ahead.35 In October 2013 the Supreme Court upheld the earlier decision and found PM 
Erdoğan and several leading members of his cabinet guilty of not complying with the 
judicial decisions and issued legal damage fines against the Prime Minister and seven 
ministers involved in the case. In the meantime, Cengiz Holding expanded its group 
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interests in energy by winning other public tenders and signed a credit line of 50 million 
USD with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for a 
modernisation project worth 232 million USD (see Table 3)36. 
Aside from these overt cases of political interference, there are covert ones. 
Controversy around rapidly growing business groups, which benefitted from AKP 
favouritism in privatisation are at least reported, albeit in limited scope (see Table 3). 
However, many SMEs involved in tenders remain disguised. The use of different company 
names and complex partnerships conceal the real ownership structures. Our survey shows 
highly opaque relations among firms in dissimilar industries. These findings support the 
claims made by the CEE and CME reports and others. There is miniscule information 
about bidders’ business activities, their shareholders and governing boards. For example, 
public information on the rapidly growing Kipaş Holding is very limited.  The firm’s 
webpage is similarly vague with only a three-member managing board disclosed. Its 
partner business, Ideal Medya, has been subsumed under another media firm in their 
bidding documentation. The company website has no reference to energy, but rather to 
knowledge, health and education. Its governing board is unidentified. AKP controlled local 
governments and some official sites are listed as clients37. 
 
Gas Distribution 
The first major cycle of gas privatisations were completed between 2003 and 2007 
and politically connected firms seem to have taken control of networks serving 76 per cent 
of the population in 15 out of 19 metropolitan centres. Throughout this first stage, 
consumer prices, connection fees and minimum bids have been the key negotiation points 
between the Privatisation Agency and bidders. Table 2 illustrates these and the major 
distribution networks for 66 cities. AKP connected firms won the natural gas distribution 
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By 2013, the privatisation of the gas distribution network was concluded in all 19 
major regions, except for the Istanbul region.  Politically connected firms won fifteen of 
these bids. Among them, Kazancı Holding appears to have gained a dominant position as it 
won 7 large, 8 medium and 10 small town bids (see Table 2).  However, the company is 
accused of manipulating the process through unlawful acts. First, it used two different legal 
names  (Aksa and Anadolu) in order to disguise its multiple bids from the Competition 
Authority. The minor firm, Anadolu, transferred its business to Aksa after winning the 
bids38.  However, the Competition Authority cleared the company from any wrongdoing as 
it did not see any act damaging the clause for market competition. Second, in 2005, the 
prosecutors opened a case accusing Kazancı Holding, two intermediary firms and several 
high ranked officials of bribery and corruption in privatisation tenders.  The case 
progressed slowly and finally in 2012, the defendants were found guilty of establishing 
mafia-style relations to coerce officials and manipulate tender decisions. Most notably, 
many leading figures including the CEO of Kazanci Holding, were given prison sentences 
of 3-4 years39. With the routine interference into the judiciary by the government, the 
verdict has not been enforced40. 
The privatisation tenders for natural gas distribution of major cities have significant 
economic and geo-political implications for the energy sector.  Any disruption in the 
relations with these key suppliers will have enormous impact on gas imports, market prices 
and the viability of domestic firms41. Having only feeble alternative energy sources makes 
Turkey highly vulnerable to a future energy crunch. Major firms that have personal 
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connections to the PM and the cabinet ministers attempt to transform themselves into 
leading agents in energy politics.  The AKP’s electoral success is dependent on its ability 
to expand business opportunities and secure Turkey’s growing energy needs.  Thus, the 
interests of the actors are mutually enhancing as politically connected firms are pursuing 
new geo-political roles. Kazanci Holding is a case in point. Despite fraudulent practices, 
the firm reportedly courted the government to win the Istanbul distribution network (see 
Table 3). They campaigned to develop new pipeline routes and business ventures with 
Northern Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan42. Similarly, Cengiz Holding sought deals 
with Roseneft and Gazprom with the support of the government.  These practices distort 
the new market provisions with uncompetitive behaviour and opaque political deals. These 
politically connected firms emerged also as key supporters of authoritarian policies 
through their donations to AKP initiatives and contrived capital pools43.  
Capital consolidation in energy markets is taking place through three forms of 
beneficiary firms. The large ones, such as Kazanci, Cengiz and Çalık Holdings won 
multiple bids and are involved in strategic international deals (see Table 3). These are 
personally connected to the PM and leading AKP members. The second group of firms 
originate from SMEs in regional markets with often small amounts of capital and no 
energy sector know-how but they have the access to political connections through business 
networks. Small firms subsumed in the bids as local players become part of a process of 
herding (Banerjee, 1992). Firms mimic the patterns of success in the allocation of bids by 
emulating or getting involved with connected firms. Outcomes of bids in different phases 
take a long time, but these give a signal to other potential bidders about the direction of 
decisions. A third category, those firms that did not seek party connections previously or 
were not in support of Islamic politics, herded to get fringe benefits, typically through 
subcontracting and service delivery. Those without personal connections resorted to 
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joining fraternity groups, obtained membership in MÜSİAD or TUSKON and developed 
new patronage ties with local party officials.  The massive capital base needed for the 
TÜPRAS privatisation (over 4 billon USD–one third of total electricity privatisation 
revenue) was beyond the means of members of MÜSİAD and TUSKON, mainly SMEs, in 





Turkey’s energy utility privatisation experience has been part and parcel of rising political 
Islam and its evolving relationship with neo-liberal economic policies.  As we have shown, 
moral customisations of economic rationale made significant political and institutional 
transformations possible (preposition 1). Religious references have been frequently used to 
gain moral high ground and to cover up corrupt business deals44.  While appealing to 
popular conservative values, the AKP promoted an antagonistic relationship between 
secular (morally dubious) capitalists versus hard working Muslim (moral) entrepreneurs.  
This polarisation helped to justify its manipulation of markets and privatisation assets45.   
References to AKP’s pious Muslim leadership and their benevolence have also been 
aggressively used to discredit corruption allegations that erupted in December 2013. 
Meanwhile, AKP’s governance in markets has increasingly moved towards authoritarian 
populism. Energy privatisations did not attract significant FDI, failed to lead to a 
substantial increase in R&D and had weak competition provisions.  The issues of scale and 
consolidation as well as lack of a national interest definition remain problematic for even 
publicly owned companies. 
Privatisations offered opportunities for new allocation mechanisms in favour of 
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politically connected firms (preposition 2). The AKP allocated privatised assets to a new 
breed of national champions and small regional players. The majority of winners in the 
privatisation bids enjoyed two forms of political connections: i) the leading firms displayed 
personal ties to the PM and key party officials, ii) secondary but minor regional players are 
members of pro-government groups. In a strategic industry, many winning firms are new 
to the sector and might find securing political support beneficial. However, favouritism 
and personal loyalties rose above the objectives of efficiency and competitiveness. 
Politically connected firms generally are less efficient and they are not better operators 
than state enterprises. They are likely to bring future economic and welfare costs to energy 
markets and the broader literature shows that PCFs have dubious performance outcomes 
(Fan, et al., 2007; Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar, 2008; Authors). 
Deepening business-politics ties radically changed political institutions, industry 
structures and development prospects (preposition 3). In order to build a patronage regime 
in energy markets, the AKP manipulated regulatory institutions, suppressed the media and 
advocacy groups, and immobilised the judicial process against allegations of misconduct. 
Highly personalised and opaque allocation of assets increased the power of business 
groups that enjoyed close ties with the PM and key party officials. Even the highest court 
decisions on corruption allegations have not been enforced. The most critical business 
implication of this is the legitimacy problem that the winning firms will face in the long 
run. Patronage links to party leaders can be a liability when these powerful political allies 
leave office or turn against them46. Therefore, these PCFs will work hard to keep their 
protectors in office through their rents and financial support to authoritarian institutions.   
The collusion between politicians and business interests damages political 
institutions and the regulatory framework. AKP’s moral call in markets lacks a coherent 
political philosophy. The AKP neither put forward an alternative economic programme nor 
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worked hard to develop a long-term developmentalist agenda. Thus, policy inconsistencies, 
widespread corruption and ambivalence make Islamic politics unpredictable without an 
enduring developmental ideology47. Within the last two decades, neo-liberalism and 
political Islam exhausted establishment institutions. However, the future of political Islam 
remains handicapped by authoritarian instincts and moral conundrums48. This is bad news 
for those who hoped to see economic modernisation through moderate and west-friendly 
Islamic politics in Turkey as a role model for others (Tepe, 2005; Tepe and Demirkaya, 
2011; Tuğal, 2009; 2012). 
International evidence of energy privatisations provides a pessimistic picture as 
well.  Privatisations have not been a long-term cure or a credible alternative for poor 
management under state ownership with detrimental consequences for local economies and 
disadvantaged groups (Zhang et al., 2008; Hefetz et al., 2012; Groves et al. 2013). Energy 
privatisations in Latin America brought about a range of disappointments. Evidence points 
out that neither competition nor economic growth objectives were achieved (see Macleod, 
2004 on Mexico; Blind, 2009 on Argentina). Privatisation was supposed to unlock global 
private capital flows into developing country infrastructures. These flows remained a small 
fraction of public investment. Contrary to the calls for sound regulation, institutional 
reforms and financial support, energy privatisations did not prevent bid owners’ tendency 
to seek short-term rents at the expense of long-term productivity (Bacon and Beson-Jones, 
2001). Good financial returns and efficient performance post privatisation has only been a 
short-term gain (see the cross-country study of Andres, Foster and Guasch, 2006). 
Nagayama’s (2007) findings on 83 countries suggest that neither unbundling nor the 
introduction of a wholesale pool market on their own necessarily reduces the electric 
power price. Contrary to expectations, there is a tendency for the price to rise.  
Megginson and Netter (2001) ask if privatisation can play a role in equipping 
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companies and countries to meet the challenges posed by major economic forces such as 
globalisation and new technologies. In addition to political interference and poor 
regulatory systems, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that unbundling energy 
utilities creates the capacity to face global competition, attract FDI and provide better 
value for money for customers.  On the contrary, there is evidence around the world that 
badly designed and implemented systems of deregulation and privatisation could produce 
outcomes worse than those of public monopoly (Sirasoontorn and Quiggin, 2007; Hefez et 
al., 2012; Groves et al., 2013).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The original Washington Consensus, developed by John Williamson in 1989, aimed to cure 
endemic financial and economic crises in developing countries, especially in Latin America, 
and played a critical role in their market liberalisation.  The Consensus envisaged a set of 
policy remedies, which were widely implemented as conditional lending policy templates by 
the IMF and the World Bank: 1-fiscal discipline, 2-re-orientation of public expenditures, 3-
tax reform, 4-financial liberalisation, 5-unified and competitive exchange rates, 6-trade 
liberalisation, 7-openess to FDI, 8-privatisation, 9-deregulation, 10-secure property rights (see 
Rodrik 2006 for a critique). 
2 Larner (2000) pointed out that neo-liberalism can be understood in three conceptual 
spheres: ideology, policy framework and governmentality. Neo-liberalism does not rest on a 
unified political ideology. Indeed, we argue that despite the IMF and World Bank templates, 
the fluidity of the concept makes it attractive to multiple and often contradictory adaptations 
of new market making processes.  
3 This relationship is likely to deepen further since PM Erdoğan was elected President for a 7-
year term in August 2014. 
4 In addition to promoting the idea of abolishing the Federal Reserve, sealing the US borders, 
and ending investment in infrastructure, Tea Party grass roots favour tight controls on 
immigration. The latter can deprive the US agricultural industry of a major source of cheap 
labour. This stance caused a rift between the Tea Party and their supporter, the US Chamber 
of Commerce (see Formisano, p.76).  
5 Choi and Thum (2009: 608) suggested that, “a regime may face a critical-mass problem in 
setting up a system of politically-connected firms.” They pointed out that clientelism emerges 
under specific institutional parameters such as: a) the regime has to have sufficient 
exploitative power to make it less attractive for entrepreneurs to run their firms independently 
from the political sphere; b) the stability of the regime has to be sufficiently low so that it is 
forced to share its rents with political allies. 
6 The IMF disbursed by far the largest stand-by loan, 12.821 billion USD, to support the 
regulatory and banking reforms. Given the scale of the need for financial assistance after 
February 2001, Turkey was more dependent on the support of the IMF and the World Bank 
than before, revealing the dismal outcome of two decades of liberalisation (Öniş, 2011). 7	  Turkey’s Islamist political movements have long been in ideological conflict with modern 
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secularism and a Eurocentric worldview (Gülalp, 1999; Tuğal 2009). Their political message 
was influenced by the teachings of 19th century Islamic thinkers who sought to shape an 
autonomous cultural and economic domain for Muslims in a post-colonial world (Kuran, 
1997; Mura, 2014).  
8 Several Islamic parties before the Justice and Development Party (AKP) faced closure or 
judicial bans due to their anti-establishment religious bias by secular state institutions and the 
judiciary. Nevertheless, Turkish politics accommodated and frequently promoted Islam 
against the spread of communism during the cold war. The both Prime Minister Erdoğan and 
President Abdullah Gül were members of the Refah Party, as a former party member and the 
deputy leader, respectively, until it was dissolved. A chronology of Islamist political parties 
includes the following key developments: The first Islamist party, the National Order Party 
(Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP) was established in 1970.  The Constitutional Court closed down 
MNP in 1971. Promoting a state order based on religion was against the secular republican 
ideals and the Constitutional Court also closed down a handful of its successors. The National 
Salvation Party (Milli Selamet): 1972-1980.  The Welfare Party (Refah Party-RP) in 1983-
1998; The Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) 1997-2001. All these parties were either led or 
initiated by Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011) who headed Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) 
when young cadres broke away to form AKP in 2001. 
9  This relative prosperity and policy independence is similar to the experience of other 
emerging economies (Babb, 2013). 
10 Growing political pressures unleashed unprecedented protests against the autocracy of PM 
Erdoğan in May-June 2013 across the country. Uniting around those groups who opposed the 
construction of a shopping mall in Istanbul’s Gezi Park, thousands marched in major cities to 
express their discontent with AKP rule and its infringements on personal liberties. The 
government’s heavy-handed use of the police force led to a dozen of deaths and injured more 
than seven thousand protestors. Months later, on 17 and 25 December of 2013, strings of high 
level corruption allegations, evidenced with secretly typed recordings, emerged in the internet 
showing how AKP’s top officials and their relatives, including the PM Erdoğan and his son, 
have been involved in corrupt deals and money laundering. PM Erdoğan accused the Gȕlen 
Movement of orchestrating these recordings and judicial procedures (see reporting at 
Financial Times, by Daniel Dombey, March 18, 2014).  In response, the AKP government led 
extensive purges in the judiciary and the police force to cover up, and subsequently cleaned 
all involved and closed the dossiers on 1 September 2014 (See also the reporting by Letsch, 
2013; Aras, 2013). The Gȕlen Movement had long been a partner with Erdoğan’s government 
in their power struggle against the military and secular establishment.  However, this 
cooperation turned into a fierce competition and enmity in recent years.  The Movement is 
accused of infiltrating into the police, judiciary and other state organs and pursuing an agenda 
of their own under orders from their spiritual leader, Fetullah Gȕlen, who leads a reclusive 
life in Pennsylvania, USA.   
11 While MÜSİAD emerged as a new pro-AKP business group with representative offices in 
48 countries (with 3,300 members), several business federations united to form TUSKON 
(with 45,000 members) in 2005. TUSKON’s base is dispersed among SMEs in Anatolian 
cities with links to the Gülen Movement. 
12 An important example is the former president of MÜSİAD, Ömer Bolat, who became a 
member of the governing board of the AKP.   13	  Kuran (1997) provides a critique of Islamic economics and shows that the roots of 
intellectual development on Islamic economics goes back to the cultural concerns of Muslim 
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identity in India before the partition of Pakistan led by Indian Muslim thinker, Sayyid Abu’l-
Al’la Mawdudi (1903–79). Mohammad Iqbal (1876–1938), Indian poet and philosopher, first 
played with the idea of Islamic economics as part of his search for Islamic reassertion. The 
Egyptian poet, and a leading member of the Islamic Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) 
has been one of the most prominent political thinkers on Islamic revival in the Muslim world 
and highly influential in Turkey. In his book, Milestones, Qutb presented a fundamental 
counter-hegemonic political theology along with political questions of power, sovereignty, 
the worldly as well as the spiritual (see Mura, 2014).  
 
14 A recent study carried out by several leading Islamic employers’ associations, including 
TUSKON and MÜSİAD, asserts that pious and conservative entrepreneurs have increased 
their market power in the Turkish economy.  Naturally, the study illustrates a widespread 
support for the idea that Islam and capitalism can accommodate one another while there exists 
a confused position on whether Islam offers an alternative economic perspective. Despite an 
overwhelming support for Islamic ethics, however, the share of four financial institutions that 
operate on principals of Islamic banking, is only 4.3% of total active funds in Turkish 
banking. Surveyed entrepreneurs claimed that in order to remain competitive they had to opt 
out of the risk sharing and partnership principals of Islamic banking (PESA, 2013; p.31, 32) 
 
15 The main non-Sunni Muslim minority in Turkey are the Alevis, who constitute at least 
15% of the population. In the period between 1983 and 1997, the numbers of Imam Hatip 
high schools almost doubled to 604 while student enrolment reached half a million (Pak, 
2004). Many AKP politicians, including PM Erdoğan, graduated from these high schools and 
promoted them when in power. The graduates of these schools often became professionals in 
public institutions rather than being preachers at mosques. 
16 This conservatism signals a reverse trend in women’s freedoms in Turkey, where they 
gained the right to vote and participate in municipal (1930) and general elections (1934) much 
earlier than many other nations. In addition to pursuing hostile policies toward caesarean 
births and abortion, PM Erdoğan has been promoting the idea that women should give birth to 
at least three children to avoid an aging population. The recent comment by the deputy Prime 
Minister, Bülent Arinc, one of the co-founders of AKP is illustrative and created a huge 
uproar among Turkish women. He lamented the moral decline of modern society: "A man 
should be moral but women should be moral as well, they should know what is decent and 
what is not decent…[sic.] She should not laugh loudly in front of all the world and should 
preserve her decency at all times," See, The Guardian report: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/29/turkish-minister-women-laugh-loud-bulent-
arinc#start-of-comments (accessed on 6 September 2014) 
17 We used a broad range of media as well as specialist publications through online searches 
for key words, expressions and cross-referencing. In addition to national newspapers such as 
Milliyet, Hűrriyet and Radikal, we studied Dűnya, a finance newspaper. Local newspapers 
reviewed include: Konya Haber, Kayseri Gundem, Dűzce Postasi, Gaziantep27.net, Haber 
Antalya, Antakya Gazetesi, Denizli Haber, Ordu Olay, Gazete55.net, and Yeni Adana. 
18 The International Congress on Energy and Politics (EPOL) took place in Antalya with the 
participation of industry members, academics and civil servants from EPDK in 2013. 
19 See a report by PWC, 
http://www.pwc.com.tr/tr_TR/tr/publications/industrial/energy/assets/EnergyDeals2011_v12-
n.pdf (accessed on 20 October 2012). 
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20 These include: Kolin-Limak-Cengiz, Elsan-Tümaş-Karaçay and Arsan-İşkur-Kipaş 
21 See reporting on Aksa and Fernas: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1094346&Cate
goryID=77 (accessed on 20 October 2012). 
22  See for example: http://enerjienstitusu.com/2012/07/13/ozellestirme-idaresinden-
yalanlama/ 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1089752&Cate
goryID=80 (accessed on 20 October 2012). 
23 http://www.emo.org.tr/ekler/f0917ea498b1665_ek.pdf?dergi=6  (accessed on 20 October 
2012). 
24 Before being appointed to the board of EPDK in May 2012, Ahmet Çiçek also served on 
the management board of TEKEL. 
http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Bakan_Cicekin_oglu_ismini_dun_sildirdi/285213/4/Gundem;  
http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/epdkya-cemil-cicekin-oglu-atandi-haberi-55439 
(accessed on 20 October 2012). 
25 Interview with the former manager of Turkish Petroleum and coordinator of the Centre for 
Eurasian Strategic Studies, Necdet Pamir, at the EPOL Conference, April 2013. 
26  Yavuz Baydar, a respected journalist, addressed these allegations: 
http://yavuzbaydar.wordpress.com/2014/03/07/energy-tenders-allegedly-scrapped-for-
bosphorus-360-a-company-linked-to-his-son/ (accessed on 23 March 2014). 
27 The electricity distribution grid is divided into 20 regions plus the province of Kayseri, 
which was privatized in 1990. 
28 Adıyaman and Kahraman Maraş provinces. 
29 See: http://www.kanal46.com/haber/akedasa-devirde-islemler-tamamen-bitti/37606 
30 See: http://www.kipas.com.tr/tr/kurumsal/yonetim-kurulu.html (accessed on 30 Oct 2013). 
31 The owner of Kanal 7, Aykut Zahid Akman, was found guilty of fraud in Germany and the 
whereabouts of 41 million Euros collected remains a mystery.   
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/default.aspx?aType=YazarDetay&ArticleID=992577; 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/01/23/deniz.feneri.davasinda.ceza.pazarligi.iddiasi/693
612.0/ (accessed on 30 Oct 2013). 
32 The Meram region includes Konya, Karaman, Ereğli, Niğde, Aksaray, Nevşehir, Kırşehir 
and Akşehir. 
33  Cengiz Holding took over the Oymapınar Dam and won several key mining and 
metallurgy tenders in copper and aluminium (Eti  Alüminyum, Eti Bakır and Karadeniz Bakır 
İşletmeleri). 
34 Eti Aluminyum, established in 1962, is Turkey’s sole liquid aluminium manufacturer and 
one of the world’s few integrated aluminium facilities capable of manufacturing from ore to 
end product.  
35 http://www.metalurji.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=34:haberl
er&layout=blog&Itemid=58 (accessed on 18 November 2013). 
36 See: 
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http://www.ebrd.com/pages/project/psd/2013/local_translations/44174.pdf (accessed 18 
November 2013). 
37 http://www.idealmedya.com.tr/referanslarimiz.html (accessed on 30 October 2013). 
38 http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2fDocuments%2fGerek%25c3%25a7eli%2b
Kurul%2bKarar%25c4%25b1%2fkarar3379.pdf (Accessed on 21 November 2013). 
39  http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/enerji_devi_aksanin_patronuna_hapis_soku-1094346#  
(accessed on 21 November 2013). 
40 The 2014 annual speech by the President of the Turkish Bar Association, Mr Turhan 
Feyzioğlu, addressing the subjects of political interference, disregard of the judiciary and the 
rule of law, prompted PM Erdoğan to protest; he yelled and stormed out of the conference 
hall taking with him President Gül and the Chief of Army.  The rift between the judiciary and 
the AKP reached an all time high when none of the government representatives, PM or the 
President attended the annual ceremony held by the High Court of Turkey to mark the start of 
the legal year on 1 September 2014. 
41 http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_13056-544-2-30.pdf (accessed on 21 November 2013). 
42 http://enerjienstitusu.com/2013/03/15/kazanci-holding-tanap-ve-irak-dogalgazi-icin 
temasta/ (accessed 21 November 2013). 
43 See Srivastava and Harvey (2014) and Dombey (2014). There are numerous examples on 
how PCF comply with PM Erdoğan’s directives, especially in mega projects and 
infrastructure investments. An illustrative case is the way in which businesses were coerced to 
generate a pro-AKP press by creating an informal cash pool. A seasoned journalist, Can 
Dundar, in a 5 part series in Cumhuriyet Daily, investigated these close ties. 
(http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/103021/Havuzda_paralar_boyle_depolandi.htm
l).  Based on leaked voice recordings, Dundar illustrates how PM Erdoğan forced several 
businessmen, among them Cengiz Holding and Kolin, to invest cash funds for the takeover 
bid of Sabah-ATV, a major newspaper and TV group. The businessmen talk desperately 
about the pressures they faced. We also listened to these recordings before the government 
shut down the internet sites and introduced bans on Twitter and YouTube. The 7 August 2014 
article of Dundar is especially illustrative: 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/103021/Havuzda_paralar_boyle_depolandi.html 
Another example demonstrates the extent to which pro-AKP religious education is spread by 
the support of businessmen. The TÜRGEV, a growing religious educational charity and 
school network, led by PM Erdoğan’s son, Bilal, has been receiving land and money 
donations from businessmen.  For example, the police investigations report that a leading 
construction mogul, Ali Ağaoğlu, donated 50,000 sqm land to TÜRGEV, reportedly to secure 
the help of Bilal Erdoğan in his construction licenses and land acquisition in Istanbul. (See 
Can Dundar’s analysis at Cumhuriyet: 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/102567/_Tak_tak_cuvalla_gelir_insallah_.html 
(accessed on 2 September 2014) 
44 One such striking example is the manager of Halk Bank who was caught with 4.5 million 
USD cash stored in shoeboxes at his home during the 17 December 2013 corruption inquiries. 
He tried to clean his name by claiming that the money was going to be donated to build 
Islamic preacher schools. 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/halkbank_genel_muduru_ayakkabi_kutulari_imam_hatip_i
cindi-1167347 (accessed 1 September 2014). Another widespread belief is that PM and his 
son accumulated unaccounted financial power to help Islamic causes. 
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45 In response to the widespread corruption allegations, the pro-AKP press spread the view 
that traitors and foreign enemies fabricated the evidence against good Muslims.  Morality 
based arguments won the party electoral support in March 2014 local elections and the 
presidential referendum in August 2014. 
46 A case in point is how the formerly favoured business groups and schools of the Gȕlen 
Movement began facing ruthless purges by the AKP. 
47 The government favours eclectic development policies, often dictated by PM Erdoğan, 
resting predominantly on extensive construction projects, mega infrastructure investments 
(mostly in Istanbul) and state procurement schemes. 
48 Even some of Turkey’s Islamist thinkers, such as Ali Bulaç, are deeply concerned about 
this authoritarian power consolidation, corruption and the capture of the state and the market 
by a party that promotes its own version of Islamisation. Writing in the Gȕlen Movement 
linked newspaper, Zaman, Bulaç argued that employing religion in politics for narrow 
interests not only damages the state but also Islam. http://www.zaman.com.tr/ali-bulac/din-
siyasete-karisirsa_2220066.html (accessed on 2 September 2014) 
  
	   35	  
References 
Adly A I, 2009, “Politically-embedded cronyism: the case of post-liberalization 
Egypt” Business and Politics 11(4) 1-28 
Acemoglu D, Robinson J, 2006, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 
Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Kermani A, Kwak J, Mitton T, 2010, “The value of political 
connections in the United States” unpublished WP, MIT 
Andres L, Foster V, Guasch, J L, 2006, “The impact of privatisation on the 
performance of the infrastructure sector: the case of electricity distribution in Latin 
American countries” WP 3936 World Bank Policy Research  
Aras U, 2013, “Turkish probe marks AKP-Gulen power struggle” Al Jazeera, 24 
December 
Arpac O, Bird G, 2009, “Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy 
of policy implementation” Review International Organisations 4 135–157 
Atasoy Y, 2009, Islam’s Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in 
Turkey (Palgrave – Macmillan, New York)  
Atia M, 2012, “A way to paradise: pious neoliberalism, Islam, and faith-based 
development” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 102(4) 808-827  
Atiyas İ, Dutz M, 2005, “Competition and regulatory reform in Turkey’s electricity 
industry” in BM Hoekman, S Togan (eds) Turkey: Economic Reforms and Accession 
to the European Union, Washington, DC: The World Bank and the CEPR 
Babb S, 2013, “The Washington Consensus as transnational policy paradigm: Its 
origins, trajectory and likely successor” Review of International Political Economy 20 
	   36	  
(2) 268-297 
Bacik G, 2008, “The parliamentary election in Turkey, July 2007” Electoral Studies 
27 356-390 
Bacon R, Beson-Jones J, 2001, “Global electric power reform, privatisation and 
liberalization of the electric power industry in developing countries” Annual Review 
of Energy and the Environment 26 331-359 
Bagdadioglu N, Basaran A, Waddams C, 2007, “Price, potential impact of electricity 
reforms on turkish households”, WP 07-8 Centre for Competition Policy  
Bakır C, 2009, “Wobbling but still on its feet: The Turkish Economy in the global 
financial crisis” South European Society and Politics 14(1) 71-85 
 
Bakır C, Öniş Z, 2010, “The regulatory state and Turkish banking reforms in the age 
of Post-Washington Consensus” Development and Change 41(1) 77-106 
Ban C, Blyt M, 2013, “The BRICs and the Washington Consensus: An introduction” 
Review of International Political Economy 20 (2) 241-255 
Banerjee A V, 1992, “A simple model of herd behaviour” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 107(3) 797-817 
Bartu C, Kolluoğlu A B, 2008, “Emerging spaces of neoliberalism: a gated town and 
a public housing project in Istanbul” New Perspectives on Turkey 39 5-46 
Bayırbağ M K, 2011, “Pro-Business local governance and (local) business 
associations: The case of Gaziantep” Business and Politics 13(4) 1-37 
Bekdil B, 2007, Turkey: Reporter's notebook global integrity report 
http://report.globalintegrity.org/Turkey/2007/notebook. Accessed 30 October 2013 
Blind P K, 2009, Democratic Institutions of Undemocratic Individuals: 
	   37	  
Privatisations, Labor, and Democracy in Argentina and Turkey” New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 
Bortolotti B, Faccio M, 2009, “Government control of privatized firms” The Review 
of Financial Studies 22(8) 2907-2939 
Boubakri N, Cosset J C, Saffar W 2008, “Politically connected newly privatized 
firms” Journal of Corporate Finance 14 654-673 
Choi, J P, Thum M. 2009, “The Economics of Politically Connected Firms.” 
International Journal of Tax and Public Finance, 16 605-620 
Dombey D, (18 March 2014) “Turkey: The Erdogan-Gulen showdown” Financial 
Times. 
 
Cetin T, Oğuz F, 2007, “The politics of regulation in the Turkish electricity market” 
Energy Policy 35(3) 1761–1770 
Claessens S, Feijen E, Laeven L, 2008, “Political connections and preferential access 
to finance: the role of campaign contributions” Journal of Financial Economics 88 
554–580 
Çokgezen M, 2000, “New fragmentations and new cooperations in the Turkish 
bourgeoisie” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 8 525-544 
Dombey D, “Turkey’s Erdogan dismisses latest leaked recording as a smear” 
Financial Times, February 27, 2014 
EMO-Elektrik Muhendisleri Odasi [Chamber of Electrical Enginners], 2009, Elektrik 
Dağitim Bölgeleri Üzerinde Garip İlişkiler Yumaği [A Report on Peculiar 
Relationships in the Electricity Distribution Regions], A PDF copy of this report in 
Turkish can be accessed at: 
	   38	  
http://www.emo.org.tr/ekler/edd8680b69b5486_ek.pdf?tipi=4&turu=H&sube=0 
(accessed on 28 October 2013) 
EPDK, 2013, “Natural Gas Sector Report – 2012” 
http://www.epdk.gov.tr/documents/dogalgaz/rapor_yayin/Ddp_yayin_rapor_2012.pdf 
(accessed on 20 February 2014) 
ESI (European Stability Initiative) 2005, Islamic Calvinists: Change and 
Conservatism in Central Anatolia, Berlin 
Faccio M, 2006, “Politically connected firms” American Economic Review 96 369–
386 
Faccio M, Masulis M, Mcconnell J J, 2006, “Political connections and corporate 
bailouts” Journal of Finance 61(6) 2597-2635 
Fan J P H, Wong T J, Zhang T, 2007, “Politically Connected Ceos, Corporate 
Governance and Post-Ipo Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms” 
Journal of Financial Economics 84 (1) 330-357 
Formisano R P, 2012, The Tea Party: A Brief History, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press 
Groves C, Munday M, Yakovleva N, 2013, “Fighting the pipe: neoliberal governance 
and barriers to effective community participation in energy infrastructure planning” 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 31(2) 340 – 356 
Gumuscu S, 2010, “Class, status, and party: the changing face of Political Islam in 
Turkey and Egypt” Comparative Political Studies 43(7) 835–61 
Guriev S, Rachinsky A, 2005, “The role of oligarchs in Russian capitalism” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 19(1) 131-150 
	   39	  
Gülalp H, 1999, “Political Islam in Turkey: the rise and fall of the Refah Party” The 
Muslim World 89(1) 22-41 
Harvey B, Bentley M, 2010, “Erdogan like Ataturk roils elite as Kiler rises with AK's 
power” Bloomberg Report, 13 September 
Harvey B, Bilgic T, 2013, “Erdogan’s IMF triumph masks surge in private debt: 
Turkey credit” Bloomberg Report, 14 May 
Hefetz A, Warner M E, Vigoda-Gadot E, 2012, "Privatization and intermunicipal 
contracting: the US local government experience 1992–2007" Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy 30(4) 675 – 692 
Hoşgör E, 2011, “Islamic capital / Anatolian tigers: past and present” Middle Eastern 
Studies 47(2) 343-360  
Ismail S, 2011, “Authoritarian government, neoliberalism and everyday civilities in 
Egypt” Third World Quarterly 32(5) 845-862 
Ismail S, 2013, “Piety, profit and the market in Cairo: a political economy of 
Islamisation” Contemporary Islam 7(1) 107-128 
Junisbai B, 2012, “Improbable but potentially pivotal oppositions: privatisation, 
capitalists, and political contestation in the Post-Soviet autocracies” Perspectives on 
Politics 10 891-916  
Karaman O, 2013, “Urban neoliberalism with Islamic characteristics” Urban Studies 
50 3412-3427 
Khanna T, Palepu K, 1999, “Policy shocks, market intermediaries, and corporate 
strategy: the evolution of business groups in Chile and India” Journal of Economics 
and Management Strategy 8(2) 271-310  
	   40	  
Khwaja A I, Mian A, 2005, “Do lenders favor politically connected firms? rent 
provision in an emerging financial market” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 
1371-1411 
Kuban D, Sözeri C, 2012, “Caught in the wheels of power: The political, legal and 
economic constraints on independent media and freedom of the press in Turkey” 
TESEV 
Kuran T, 1997, “Islamism and Economics: Policy Implications for a free society” 
International Review of Comparative Public Policy 9 71–102 
Larner W, 2000 “Neo-liberalism: Policy, ideology, governmentality” Studies in 
Political Economy 63 5-25 
Letsch C, 2013, “Turkish PM: corruption probe part of dirty operation against 
administration” The Guardian, 18 December 
Macleod D, 2004 Downsizing the State: Privatisation and the Limits of Neo-liberal 
Reform in Mexico, (Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA) 
McGraw B, 2010 Faith in Politics: Religion and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK) 
Megginson W, Netter J, 2001, “From state to market: a survey of empirical studies on 
privatisation” Journal of Economic Literature 39(2)321–389 
Mura A, 2014, “The inclusive dynamics of Islamic universalism: from the vantage point of 
Sayyid Qutb’s critical philosophy” Comparative Philosophy 5(1) 29-54 
Nagayama N, 2007, “Effects of regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry 
on electricity prices in developing countries” Energy Policy 35(6) 3440–3462 
Nam C, 1995, “South Korea’s big business clientelism in democratic reform” Asian 
	   41	  
Survey 25(4) 357-366  
Öniş Z, 2006, “Varieties and crises of neoliberal globalisation: Argentina, Turkey and 
the IMF” Third World Quarterly 27(2) 239-263 
Öniş Z, 2011, “Power, interests and coalitions: the political economy of mass 
privatisation in Turkey” Third World Quarterly 32(4) 707-724 
Özkıvrak Ö, 2004, “Electricity restructuring in Turkey” Energy Policy 33 1339-1350 
Pak, S. Y. (2004) ‘Articulating the Boundary between Secularism and Islamism: The 
Imam-Hatip Schools of Turkey’, Anthropology & Education Quarterly, 35(3): 324-
344 
Payne D, 2010, “Spiritual security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian 
Foreign Ministry: collaboration or cooptation?” Journal of Church and State 52(4) 
712-727  
Peck J, 2010 Construction of Neoliberal Reason ( Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
PESA-Politik Economik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi [Political, Economic and 
Social Research Centre], Dindar/Muhafazkâr İşadamları Perspektifinden İslam 
Ekonomisi ve Katılım Bankacılığı [Islamic Economics and Partnership Banking 
through the Perspectives of Religious/Conservative Businessmen], November 2013. 
A PDF copy of this report in Turkish can be accessed at: 
http://pesar.org/sites/default/files/islam_ekonomisi_rapor.pdf 
Privatisation Agency of Turkey, 2009, Privatisation Report, Ankara 
Privatisation Agency of Turkey, 2010, Privatisation Report, Ankara 
Polat N, 2013, “Regime change in Turkey” International Politics 50(3) 435–454 
	   42	  
Ramamurti R, 2000, “A multilevel model of privatisation in emerging economies” 
The Academy of Management Review 25(3) 525-550 
Rodrik D, 2006, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?” 
Harvard University, January 2006 
http://web.archive.org/web/20090320154223/http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Le
ssons%20of%20the%201990s%20review%20_JEL_.pdf  
Rudnyckyj D, 2009, “Spiritual economies: Islam and neoliberalism in contemporary 
Indonesia” Cultural Anthropology 24 104–141 
Salas-Porras A, 2005, “Changing the basis of political support in Mexico: pro-
business networks and the market reform agenda” Review of International Political 
Economy 12(1) 129-154  
Sirasoontorn P, Quiggin J, 2007, “The political economy of privatisation in the Thai 
electricity industry” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 12(3) 403–419 
Sönmez Ü, 2011, “The political economy of market and regulatory reforms in 
Turkey: the logic and unintended consequences of ad-hoc strategies” New Political 
Economy 16(1) 101-130 
Srivastava M, Harvey B, 2014, “Erdogan eye on ‘Crazy Projects’ links turkey scandal 
to builders” Bloomberg Report, 6 January 2014 
Tankha S, 2009, “Lost in translation: interpreting the failure of electric power 
privatisation in Brazil” Journal of Latin American Studies 41(1) 59-90 
Tekeli R, Kaplan M, 2008, "Determinants of the distribution of the central-
government budgetary grants in Turkey" Environment and Planning C: Government 
and Policy 26(5) 954 – 967 
Tepe S, 2005, “Turkey's AKP: a model "Muslim-Democratic" party?” Journal of 
	   43	  
Democracy 16(3) 69-82 
Tepe S, Demirkaya B, 2011, “(Not) getting religion: has political science lost sight of 
Islam?” Politics and Religion 4(2) 203-228 
The Chamber of Electrical Engineers, 2009, Privatisation Report, İstanbul 
Tuğal Z C, 2009, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press  
Tuğal Z C, 2012 “Fight or acquiesce? religion and political process in Turkey's and 
Egypt's Neoliberalizations”  Development and Change 43(1) 23–51 
Ulusoy A, Oğuz F. 2007, “The privatisation of electricity distribution in Turkey: a 
legal and economic analysis” Energy Policy 35 5021–5034 
Wank D L, 2002, “Business-State clientelism in China: decline or evolution”, in 
Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of 
Guanxi, Eds D Gold, D Guthrie, D Wank  D, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Yavuz M H, 2004, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford) 
Zhang Y F, Parker D, Kirkpatrick C, 2008, “Electricity sector reform in developing 
countries: an econometric assessment of the effects of privatisation, competition and 
regulation” Journal of Regulatory Economics 33(2) 159-178 
  
	   44	  
Figure 1.	  Foreign direct investment and privatization revenues (billion $) 	  
	  
Source: Privatization Administration and Turkish Treasury, 2013 
*By the end of June 	  	  	  	  
Figure 2. The distribution of the type of privatization sales a
 
Source: Privatization Administration, 2013 
a: The figure shows the share of the value of each methods applied between 1985 and 2013. 
The category of “Other” includes privatization via capital markets and other transfers. The 
value of electricity distribution privatization accounts for %22 of total privatization revenues 
collected between 1986 and 2013. All electricity distribution bids have been carried out in the 
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